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INTRODUCTION 
On June 17th 2013, representatives for the European Union and 
the United States gathered at the G8 Summit in Northern Ireland and 
announced their commitment to the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (the “TTIP”) for the first time.1 That day 
represented a special moment for relations between the European 
                                                                                                                                     
1. See President Obama, European Commission President Barroso, and European 
Council President Van Rompuy, Remarks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (June 17, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/
remarks-president-obama-uk-prime-minister-cameron-european-commission-pr; Presidents 
Barroso and Obama Announce Launch of TTIP Negotiations, DELEGATION E.U. TO U.S. (Jan. 
11, 2014), http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/ttip-launch-with-president-obama-at-g8-a-
powerful-demonstration-of-our-determination-to-shape-an-open-and-rules-based-world-says-
president-barroso/ (discussing how politicians have stressed the importance of TTIP). 
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Union and the United States.2 The TTIP, if ever realized, will 
integrate two of the most developed, sophisticated, and certainly 
largest economies in the world.3 Since its ideation, both parties 
recognized that concluding the TTIP did not represent an easy task, 
but they promised to find convincing answers to legitimate concerns 
and solutions to thorny issues.4 
The purpose of the TTIP is to reaffirm the strong partnership and 
the shared values of democracy and individual freedom held by the 
European Union and the United States in a common commitment to 
create jobs and sustainable growth.5 These parties aim to build their 
common wealth and a safer, more prosperous world for future 
generations.6  
If ratified, the TTIP would feature a chapter on investments and 
an investor-state arbitration clause.7 Investments play a central role in 
any modern economy and today, investments are commonly made 
across borders.8 When companies invest they create new trade 
benefits, jobs, and income.9 International investors need provisions 
that ensure certain protections, such as assurances that they will be 
treated in the same manner as domestic investors.10 Sometimes, 
domestic courts are not appropriate to resolve trans-border investment 
disputes, especially when the investor is victim to expropriation 
without proper compensation, is the subject of discrimination, or is 
deprived of due process.11 In such cases, the collection of protections 
known as Investor-State Dispute Solutions (“ISDS”) is important as it 
provides for a neutral forum for resolving these international 
                                                                                                                                     
2. See supra note 1 (addressing the relevance of the episode). 
3. See id. (stating the importance of the TTIP). 
4. See id. (referring to the understaking of the parties). 
5. Joint Statement EU-US Summit, E.U. EXTERNAL ACTION (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140326_02_en.pdf. 
6. See id. (describing the final aim of the parties). 
7. See European Commission, Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) in European Union Agreements, EUROPA (Mar. 2014), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152273.pdf; Mark Weaver, 
Comment, The Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): ISDS 
Provisions, Reconciliation, and Future Trade Implications, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 225, 
235-36 (2014) (specifying the contents of the TTIP). 
8. See supra note 7 (articulating the relevance of foreign investments). 
9.  See id. (disclosing the advantages of investments). 
10. See id. (revealing what investors need). 
11. See id. (explaining why domestic courts are not apt for cross border investment 
dispute). 
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disputes.12 This means that the parties agree to give governments the 
right to regulate in the public interest, to define terms like “indirect 
expropriation” and “fair and equitable treatment,” and to prevent 
abuse of the system and conflicts of interest in arbitrators by 
establishing a code of conduct.13 Investment arbitration can be 
formulated by bilateral treaties (international agreements between two 
parties), multilateral treaties (an international agreement between 
several parties), and foreign investment law enacted by states at the 
national level.14 
The ISDS represents a critical aspect within the TTIP.15 
Opponents to the TTIP argue that bilateral investment treaties 
(“BITs”) and ISDS give foreign investors “special rights” unavailable 
to domestic firms.16 Since foreign nationals are empowered to 
challenge a sovereign state, opponents affirm that they can easily 
attack a government’s policy and deter governments from enacting 
sound policies. For example, critics allege that states will fail to 
benefit the environment or to improve the health or safety of their 
populations, fearing that those policies might trigger an ISDS action 
from a foreign investor.17 
The ISDS system constitutes one of the most discussed topics in 
the modern era.18 The number of suits filed against countries at the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) 
                                                                                                                                     
12. See id. (stating one characteristic of the ISDS). 
13.  See id. (clarifying what an ISDS clause usually provides for). 
14. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE, & MATTHEW WEINIGER, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 26 (2008); International Investment Agreements 
Navigator, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountryGrouping#
iiaInnerMenu (laying out where investment arbitration can usually be found). 
15. See Michael Robinson, Is democracy threatened if companies can sue countries?, 
BBC (Mar. 31 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32116587; Europeans Don’t Want 
Investor State Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements, STOP TTIP, https://stop-
ttip.org/europeans-dont-want-investor-state-dispute-settlement-trade-agreements/; Marley 
Weiss, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.outsourcingjustice.com/investor-state-dispute-settlement/ (introducing critical 
aspects of the ISDS clause in the TTIP). 
16. See generally Scott Miller and Gregory N. Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
A Reality Check, CSIS (Jan. 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/150116_Miller_
InvestorStateDispute_Web.pdf; see also  Investor-state dispute settlement: special rights for 
investors, serious threat to our climate, TRANSNAT’L INST. (Nov. 12, 2015), 
https://www.tni.org/en/event/investor-state-dispute-settlement-special-rights-for-investors-
serious-threat-to-our-climate (discussing foreign investors rights in investor state arbitration). 
17. See Stop TTIP, supra note 15; Weiss, supra note 15 (introducing critical aspects of 
the ISDS clause in the TTIP and analyzing some criticism of the ISDS clause). 
18. See supra note 7 (analyzing what the ISDS represents in the modern society). 
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is now around 600, and it grows an average of one case per week.19 
Concerns come especially from civil society. One of the latest 
examples is that, after the twelfth round of TTIP negotiations, 280 
civil society organizations from across Europe (with the support of 
US and Canadian groups) issued a statement calling on the European 
Commission and the United States Trade Representative to eliminate 
the ISDS from the TTIP and all other trade agreements.20 The main 
concerns relate not only to criticisms of the exclusive rights granted to 
foreign investors and their ability to challenge the public policy of a 
sovereign state, but also the lack of democratic principles, the 
impossibility to change the rules after the treaty will be signed, and 
the absence of local remedies.21 Finally, the statement questions 
whether TTIP’s ISDS provisions provide any actual use, since parties 
usually have legal systems perfectly capable of handling disputes with 
foreign investors without referring to these mechanisms.22 Even if it is 
important to consider the strong concerns over the ISDS in the TTIP 
and in general, this Comment will focus primarily on legal aspects, 
trying to speculate on possible future developments in the negotiation 
of the TTIP. 
This Comment first analyzes the structure of the possible ISDS 
provision in the TTIP. Part I represents an overview of the TTIP, by 
laying out what this free trade agreement entails and by discussing the 
agreement’s investment chapter, which constitutes one of the twenty-
four chapters contained in the proposal and included in the Rules. Part 
II will consider the typical features and structure of International 
Investment Agreements (“IIAs”), as well as United States and 
European Union positions, outlining the differences and the 
similarities between the United States’ and European Union’s 
approach to IIAs. Part III will discuss the negotiation of TTIP and 
some of the provisions that have been subject to public consultation in 
Europe. This Comment concludes that the United States’ and 
                                                                                                                                     
19. See 280 organizations from Europe, Canada and the US denounce the inclusion of 
investors’ rights in TTIP, SEATTLE TO BRUSSELS NETWORK (Feb. 22, 2016), 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/isds-statement-feb2016/ [hereinafter 280 organizations]; Claire 
Provost and Matt Kennard, The obscure legal system that lets corporations sue countries, 
GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-
system-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid (stating some data related to ISDS system). 
20. See 280 organizations, supra note 19 (introducing Statement against Investor 
Protection in TTIP, CETA, and other trade deals). 
21. See id. (listing some criticisms of ISDS analyzed by the statement). 
22. See id.  (wondering about the real utility of these systems). 
1360 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1355 
European Union’s positions are similar, and that conflicts between the 
two approaches are even potentially reconcilable. 
I. TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP: 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND INVESTMENT CHAPTER 
This Part explores the current status of the TTIP, defines the 
main aspects of this agreement and describes the rationale behind the 
agreement’s investment chapter. Part I.A discusses the actual 
negotiations on the TTIP as well as its main purpose and structure. 
Part I.B briefly outlines what free trade agreements (“FTAs”) are, and 
distinguishes them from other similar agreements— in particular from 
BITs. 
A. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
The TTIP is a proposed FTA currently under negotiation 
between the United States and European Union.23 The TTIP deals 
with three different areas: market access, regulatory components, and 
rules.24 Concerning the area of market access, the TTIP’s goal is to 
increase market access through the elimination of barriers to trade and 
investment in goods, services, and agriculture, as well as the further 
opening of government procurement markets. Currently, the average 
tariffs between the United States and the European Union are already 
relatively low, at an average rate of about 3.5% ad valorem for the 
United States and about 5.5% for the European Union.25 However, 
there are higher tariffs on certain import-sensitive product categories 
such as dairy, sugar and confectionery, beverages and tobacco, fish 
and fish merchandises, and textiles and apparel.26 Given the 
                                                                                                                                     
23. See generally Shayerah Ilias Akhtar & Vivian C. Jones, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R43158, PROPOSED TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
PARTNERSHIP (TTIP): IN BRIEF  (2013); European Commission, The Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP): TTIP explained, EUROPA (Mar. 19, 2015) 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152462.pdf [hereinafter European 
Commission]. 
24. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 1; European Commission, supra note 23, at 1 
(analyzing the main parts of the TTIP). 
25. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 6; European Commission, supra note 23, at 1 
(outlining how US-European Union market works and how tariffs currently stand). 
26. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 6; The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) TTIP explained, supra note 23, at 1 (discussing which products feature 
higher tariffs between United States and European Union). 
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magnitude of the transatlantic relationship, further elimination and 
reduction of tariffs could yield significant economic gains.27 
In relation to the regulatory issues, the TTIP aims to enhance 
regulatory coherence and cooperation between the United States and 
European Union.28 The crux of the TTIP, as regarded by many 
commentators, hinges on regulatory issues.29 Fundamental sectors of 
interest include automobiles, chemicals, cosmetics, information 
communication technologies, medical devices, pesticides, and 
pharmaceuticals.30 However, there is disagreement on whether a 
comprehensive agreement on regulatory issues will actually be 
reached, as stark differences between the United States and European 
Union still exist.31 First, the United States and European Union have 
been discussing various regulatory disparities, and although many 
have been resolved, a number of issues still remain.32 Second, some 
of the regulatory differences depend on divergent public preferences 
and values.33 For example, European consumers usually prefer 
“naturally produced” foods, while American consumers are inclined 
to accept products developed by alternative forms of agricultural 
production, such as genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”).34 
Third, while the European Union has a preventative decision-taking 
approach in the case of risk management (known as the 
“precautionary principle”), some United States enterprises think that 
this approach can adversely impact businesses since it may lead to 
                                                                                                                                     
27. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 6; The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) TTIP explained, supra note 23, at 1 (addressing that a change of the tariffs 
could have a strong economic impact). 
28. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; European Commission, supra note 23, at 1 
(affirming what the regulatory chapter will realize). 
29. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; see generally Irving A. Williamson et. al., 
Trade Barriers that U.S. Small And Medium-sized Enterprises Perceive as Affecting Exports to 
the European Union, USITC (March 2014), http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/
pub4455.pdf (elucidating that the regulatory chapter is often considered the most important 
part of the TTIP). 
30. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; see generally supra note 29. (listing the 
main areas of the regulatory chapter). 
31. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; See generally supra note 29. (noting that 
there will be difficulties in finalizing the agreement). 
32. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; See generally supra note 29 (addressing 
problems related to the regulatory chapter). 
33. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 7; See generally supra note 29(stating that 
some of the differences between United States and European Union relate to preferences and 
values). 
34. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23 at 7; See generally supra note 29 (illustrating an 
example of different preferences between United States and European Union consumers). 
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stringent regulatory limitations.35 The European Union is discussing 
these regulatory standards with the United States on the strict 
condition that no concession is made regarding the levels of 
protection currently in Europe, such as health shields, environmental 
safeguards, and consumer protections.36 Regulatory calibration and 
mutual recognition will only be possible if confluence on the safety 
and environmental standards is assured.37 
Finally, the TTIP will develop new rules in areas such as foreign 
direct investment, intellectual property rights, labor, the environment, 
and emerging areas of trade.38 Many trade rules are already regulated 
by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), of which both the United 
States and European Union are members, which means that both 
parties will probably refer to them.39 Other trade-related rules, while 
not addressed in the WTO, have become a standard part of United 
States and European Union FTAs with other countries.40 The 
negotiations could also break new ground on other issues that are not 
heavily featured (or even present) in prior FTAs and multilateral 
agreements, such as rules concerning state-owned enterprises.41 
An agreement on market access, regulations and rules is 
fundamental because it represents an opportunity to boost 
transatlantic economic growth.42 Both limitations on market access 
and differences on rules and regulation often cost time and money.43 
                                                                                                                                     
35. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23 at 7; See generally supra note 29 (clarifying that 
while European Union prefers a precautionary approach, United States disagrees, considering 
the impact on small-business activities). Concerning the precautionary principle look at article 
191 TFEU.  
36. European Commission, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the conditions imposed by 
European Union for the negotiation of regulatory measures). 
37. See id. (noting which guarantee will probably be necessary for reaching the 
agreement). 
38. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 8; see generally Clara Weinhardt & Fabian 
Bohnenberger, TTIP vs. WTO: Who sets global standards?, EURACTIV (Jan. 13, 2016),  
http://www.euractiv.com/section/sustainable-dev/opinion/ttip-vs-wto-who-sets-global-
standards/ (demonstrating the scope of the TTIP). 
39. See supra note 38 (commenting that TTIP rules may be similar to some already 
established practices). 
40. See id. (asserting that some rules, not contained in the WTO are considered 
standards). 
41. See id.. (arguing that the TTIP could potentially create new standards). 
42. See Akhtar & Jones, supra note 23, at 1; European Commission, supra note 23, at 1 
(stressing that the TTIP can represent). 
43. See What’s TTIP?, U. DENV. http://www.du.edu/korbel/ceuce/publications/
blog/2014/lambert-what-is-ttip.html (last visited May 19, 2016); Klint Alexander, The 
Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its Implications for U.S. 
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This is why if the TTIP is finalized, the United States and European 
Union could make real savings for their businesses, create jobs, and 
bring better value for consumers.44 
B. Free Trade Agreements 
The TTIP is being negotiated as a FTA and it must be 
distinguished from BITs.45 A BIT is a treaty between only two states 
that governs the codification of rules and handling of investment 
disputes between a member state (a country party to such an 
international agreement) and the individuals and companies of the 
other member state.46 An FTA is a trade arrangement between two or 
more countries and serves to provide all parties to the deal 
preferential treatment in trade by removing tariffs and nontariff 
barriers between members of the agreement.47 Consequently, while 
FTAs may often be similar in effect to BITs, the basic objectives of 
FTAs and BITs differ.48 BITs seek to promote investment between a 
pair of countries by providing investors with confidence in foreign 
regulatory environments.49 FTAs are mechanisms for trade 
liberalization that aim to eliminate discrimination against imports by 
removing tariffs and other restrictions on the trade of goods.50 
In the past, BITs and FTAs were two separate and parallel legal 
instruments that had to address issues in different fields.51 Nowadays, 
there are more and more FTAs being concluded and it is quite 
common for FTAs to have an investment chapter.52 Trade and 
                                                                                                                                     
Business, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://corporatecomplianceinsights.com/the-proposed-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-
partnership-ttip-and-its-implications-for-us-business/ (addressing problems of barriers in 
trade). 
44. See supra note 43 (stating what the TTIP can bring in the world economy). 
45. See Russell Thirgood, Bilateral Investment Treaties, GLOBAL LEGAL POST (Jan. 7, 
2014),  http://www.globallegalpost.com/global-view/bilateral-investment-treaties-providing-
unlimited-opportunities-58721287/; Weaver, supra note 7, at 228. (stating that BITs are 
different from FTAs). 
46. See supra note 45 (defining what a BIT is). 
47. See id. (specifying what a FTA is). 
48. See id. (noting that even if similar the BITs and the FTAs have different objectives). 
49. See id. (discussing the scope of the BITs). 
50. See id. (describing the general scope of FTAs). 
51. See LEON E. TRAKMAN & NICOLA W. RANIERI, REGIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 22 (2013); Chang-fa Lo, A Comparison of Bit and the Investment Chapter 
of Free Trade Agreement, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 147, 168(2008) 
(discussing how BITs and FTAs were considered in the past). 
52. See supra note 51  (considering that the content of FTA has changed). 
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investment are more integrated, encompassing various emerging 
elements of international commerce: exports, imports used in exports, 
use of foreign affiliates for sale, globalized production and 
distribution in foreign direct investments.53 
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION 
AND THE INVESTOR STATE DISPUTE SOLUTION CLAUSE IN 
THE TTIP 
This Part discusses how investor-state arbitration works and how 
the European Union and United States approach the negotiation of the 
TTIP. Part II.A explains how BITs are structured, discusses their 
main provisions, and compares them to the typical standards of 
investor-state arbitration. Part II.B describes the European Union and 
United States’s background on the TTIP and the actual approach to 
the investor-state clause in the agreement in question. 
A. Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Main Provisions of 
International Investment Agreements 
The first BIT was signed in 1959 between Germany and 
Pakistan.54 Many followed suit and exponentially increased to reach a 
global total of 2,928 BITs in 2015.55 A BIT is typically structured to 
include the following sections: a preamble, definitions, admission, 
substantive rights (fair and equitable treatment, most favored nation, 
national treatment, umbrella clause and full protection and security, 
protection from expropriation), compensation for losses, free transfer 
of payments, settlement of disputes, subrogation, state to state dispute 
and duration.56 This Part will explore the main provisions of a BIT 
and investor-state arbitration generally, as well as some procedural 
aspects. 
                                                                                                                                     
53. See id. (stating that trade and investments are two connected subject). 
54. See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Pak.-Ger., Nov. 25, 
1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24.  
55. See UNCTAD, supra note 14. 
56. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 52; Jarrod Wong, Umbrella 
Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the 
Divide between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes , 14 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 135, 141 (explaining how a BIT is constructed). 
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1. Provisions Regarding the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
A tribunal has jurisdiction under a BIT only if three elements are 
met: the notions of investor, investment, and the duration of the 
treaty.57 A crucial component of how BITs define investors involves 
nationality, and when a person or corporation can be defined as a 
national of a foreign state. Likewise, questions regarding investment 
involve how broad that definition is. Finally, issues concerning the 
duration of a BIT look to what happens when the treaty expires. 
Concerning the concept of nationality, before the development 
of international investment treaties nationality was relevant to 
determine whether a state could bring a claim of an injured alien 
under diplomatic protection.58 In particular, customary international 
law allowed a State to confer nationality upon a person only if there 
was a “genuine link” between that person and the state of 
nationality.59 The relevance of the state nationality, at the time of the 
diplomatic protection, was highlighted in a famous case, Belgium v. 
Spain, where Belgium claimed that Spain should be held accountable 
for an injury to a Canadian corporation operating in Spain. It was 
found that only the State from where the company came from can 
exercise this right to seek payment.60 No such law had been 
established for shareholders.61 If a wrong was done to a company that 
resulted in harm to its shareholders, then only the State (representing 
the company) had the authority to seek compensation.62 The court 
found that Belgium did not have the right to bring Spain to court since 
the company was located in Canada.63 
Now under investor-state arbitration, in nearly every case, only 
nationals of a contracting State other than the host State in which the 
                                                                                                                                     
57. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 29; Alexandre de Gramont & 
Maria Gritsenko, Key Issues and Recent Developments in International Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, CROWELL & MORING LLP 6 (2007), https://www.crowell.com/documents/Key-
Issues-and-Recent-Developments-in-International-Investment-Treaty-Arbitration.pdf. 
58. See supra note 57 (stating which was the function of the nationality definition when 
there were no international investment agreements). 
59. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgement, 1955 I.C.J Rep. 23. 
60. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co, Limited (Belg. v. 
Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 38, ¶ 53 (specifying how diplomatic protection worked). 
61. See id. (noting that shareholders do not have the right to bring a claim).  
62. See id. (explaining that the state entitled to bring a claim was the state in which the 
company has nationality). 
63. See id. (determining which country could bring the claim). 
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investment is made can be protected by a treaty’s provisions.64 
Usually natural persons are considered nationals of a state when they 
are citizens.65 However, it is more complex to identify the nationality 
of a corporation.66 Usually BITs use one or a combination of the three 
following tests: incorporation, which refers to the nationality of the 
company via the State under the laws of which it is organized; 
control, where an investor that has the nationality of one BIT party is 
entitled to protection only of investment in the territory of the other 
BIT party that it owns or controls; and/or management of the 
company, which ascribes nationality to the State where the company 
investor has its place of business.67 
One of the main cases concerning the nationality tests for a 
corporation is Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, where the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Tribunal discussed 
whether jurisdiction existed to hear claims brought by Tokios 
Tokelės.68 The Tribunal, interpreting Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention, established that the nationality of a corporation must be 
decided in accordance with the place of incorporation in the absence 
of an express “control provision.”69 Consequently, although ninety-
nine percent of Tokios was owned by a Ukrainian national, the 
Tribunal determined that it was a Lithuanian corporation.70 In his 
dissenting opinion, Professor Weil proposed a more flexible 
approach.71 He suggested that it was necessary to look at the origin of 
capital, not a company’s formal incorporation. To avoid that, in 
contrast with the purpose of the ICSID system, the ICSID mechanism 
                                                                                                                                     
64. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14; Alexandre de Gramont & Maria 
Gritsenko, supra note 57 (2007) (clarifying that the investment agreement protects foreign 
nationals and the nationality represents the subject matter jurisdiction). 
65. See Nottebohm Case, supra note 59, at 23. 
66. McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 52; ANDRÉS RIGO SUREDA, 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 43 (2012) (affirming 
that it is easier to identify the nationality of a natural person than the nationality of a 
corporation). 
67. See See SUREDA, supra note 66 (listing the different tests which can be used to 
identify the nationality of a corporation). 
68. See Tokeles v. Ukraine, ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 23 (Apr. 29 2004) 
(introducing the case regarding Tokios Tokeles, a Lithuanian corporation, with no substantial 
business activities in Lithuania, 99 percent of its shares in the corporate entity owned by 
Ukrainian nationals, managerial control of the company vested in Ukrainian nationals, and 
capital originating in Ukraine). 
69. Id. (discussing the application of the incorporation test). 
70. See id. (explaining the finding of the Tribunal). 
71. See id. (introducing the dissenting opinion). 
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would be applied to national investments (“veil piercing doctrine”).72 
The case is relevant because the Tribunal established that the doctrine 
of “veil piercing” should not override the terms of the BIT, resulting 
in the Tribunal’s declining jurisdiction.73 Finally, it is important to 
point out that the ICSID Tribunals established that the corporation 
must possess home-state nationality continuously from the date of 
injury to the date of official commencement of the arbitration 
request.74 
Considering the concept of investment, almost all BITs adopt a 
similar formula for satisfying the definition of investment, which 
usually includes a widely inclusive phrase as well as a list of specific 
categories such as property, shares contracts, and intellectual property 
rights.75 One of the most well-known definitions of “investment” is 
provided by the ICSID Tribunal in Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and 
Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, where two Italian 
companies claimed damages against Morocco.76 The Tribunal 
determined that investments are comprised of four elements: 
contributions to the economic development of the host State, 
monetary contribution, certain duration of performance for a contract, 
and a participation in the risks of the transaction.77 
Notwithstanding, the notion of investment is broad. Tribunals 
usually consider pre-contract costs as separate to the investment 
unless a State consents otherwise.78 Tribunals also usually recognize 
indirect investment and consequently they generally consider the 
claims brought by shareholders, whether they are controlling 
shareholders or not, as valid ultimate beneficiaries.79 
                                                                                                                                     
72. See id. (explaining the control test). 
73. See id. (explaining the relevance of the case). 
74. See The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. U.S., ARB(AF)/98/3, 
Award, ¶ 225 (June 26, 2003) (discussing a case where the chairman of a Canadian 
corporation involved in the death-care industry filed claims seeking damages for alleged 
injuries arising out of litigation in which the company was involved in Mississippi state 
courts). 
75. See Energy Charter Treaty, art. 1(6), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 ILM 360, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, 
(addressing the notion of investment). 
76. See Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, [insert pincite] (July 23, 2001) (describing the foremost 
definition of investment). 
77. See id. (describing the foremost definition of investment). 
78. See Milhaly Int’l Corp. v. Sri Lanka, ARB/00/2, Award, ¶ 61 (Mar. 15, 2002) 
(explaining that pre-investment is generally not considered part of the investment). 
79. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 184-91; Inna Uchkunova, 
Indirect Investments Through Chain of Intermediary Companies: A Philosopher’s Stone or 
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Finally, the tribunal can have jurisdiction only if the BIT 
temporally covers the investment.80 However, an investment can 
possibly be protected even if a BIT came into force after the 
investment was made, as many treaties include a retroactive provision 
that expressly establishes this.81 In addition, an investment can also be 
covered under a treaty when the treaty ceases to exist.82 BITs 
generally provide for a fixed duration of at least ten years.83 However, 
the treaties usually continue in force until a State provides specific 
notice of its intent to withdraw.84 Moreover, after termination, there is 
usually a period during which investments originally covered by the 
BIT continue to retain protections provided under the treaty.85 
2. Provisions Regarding Substantive Rights of the Investor 
BITs always provide foreign investors with standard benefits, 
which, despite some exceptions, are considered common features of 
all investment treaties.86  In particular, some of most important 
substantive rights include: the fair and equitable standard, protections 
in case of expropriation, full protection and security, national 
treatment, and the most favored nation treatment. 
                                                                                                                                     
Not Any More?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jul. 3, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
blog/2013/07/03/indirect-investments-through-chain-of-intermediary-companies-a-
philosophers-stone-or-not-any-more/ (stating that the notion of investment regularly includes 
indirect investments). 
80.  See generally Johan Billiet, International Investment Arbitration: A Practical 
Handbook (2016); Alexandre de Gramont & Maria Gritsenko, supra note 57. 
81. See Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Alb., ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 192 (Dec. 24, 
1996) (noting that investments may be protected retrospectively). 
82. See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. U.S., ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 68 (Oct. 11, 2002) 
(observing that investments are covered post-cessation). 
83. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 128; UNCTAD, bilateral 
investment treaties 1995–2006: Trends in investment rulemaking,  http://unctad.org/en/
docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf (clarifying the duration of a BIT). 
84. See supra note 83.  
85. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 92; Patricio Grané, Umbrella 
Clause Decisions: The Class of 2012 and a Remapping of the Jurisprudence, KLUWER ARB. 
BLOG (Jan. 17, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/01/17/umbrella-clause-decisions-
the-class-of-2012-and-a-remapping-of-the-jurisprudence/(discussing the protection after the 
termination of the BIT). 
86. See The Basics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, SIDLEY, http://www.sidley.com/
experience/the-basics-of-bilateral-investment-treaties; MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 240 (2d ed., 2012) 
(introducing the standard rights of BITs). 
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The fair and equitable treatment standard is recognized as part of 
customary international law.87 This standard is a non-contingent right, 
usually formulated with vague and imprecise language.88 This 
contributes in large part to the controversy surrounding this standard, 
mainly because many of its imprecise formulations provide for 
different interpretations of its content.89 Generally, this standard 
relates to the treatment of investors by the host State’s courts and to 
the administrative decision-making of the host State.90 
Considering the role of a host State’s courts, the ICSID Tribunal 
in Azinian v. Mexico opined that a failure to entertain a suit, undue 
delay, inadequate administration of justice, or a clear and malicious 
misapplication of the law can cause a breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard and, in particular, a denial of justice.91 An example 
of how a national court may be sanctioned for breach of fair and 
equitable treatment is represented by Loewen, a famous case 
pertaining to the American legal system.92 In Loewen, the Canadian 
claimant alleged that the jury ruling which awarded its American 
competitor US$500 million in damages was unfair and 
discriminatory.93 The Tribunal found that the judicial process 
“amounted to an international wrong” because local procedural rules 
required Loewen to post a bond of 125 percent of the amount of the 
judgment in order to secure a stay of execution pending appeal.94  
                                                                                                                                     
87. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg., ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 284 (May 12, 2005) 
(affirming that the fair and equitable standard under domestic law is not different from the one 
under international law). According to the Tribunal, the “treaty standard of fair and equitable 
treatment and its connection with the required stability and predictability of the business 
environment founded on solemn legal and contractual commitments, is not different from the 
international law minimum standard and its evolution under customary law.” Id. 
88. See generally Mahnaz Malik, Bulletin #3: Fair and Equitable Treatment, IISD 
(Sept. 2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/best_practices_bulletin_3.pdf; Stephan W. Schill, 
Book Review, 20 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. 236, 236 (2009) (reviewing Ioana Tudor’s The 
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign Investment 
andintroducing the fair and equitable treatment standard). 
89. See Malik, supra note 88, at 9; Schill, supra note 88, at 236 (addressing a problem 
regarding the fair and equitable treatment standard). 
90. See Malik, supra note 88, at 9; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 226 
(introducing the context in which a fair and equitable treatment issue can arise). 
91. See Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v. Mex., ARB (AF)/97/2, 
Award, ¶ 102-03 (Nov. 1, 1999). 
92. See Malik, supra note 88, at 10; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 
227 (introducing two cases in which domestic courts have been sanctioned for violation of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard). 
93.  See supra note 74.  
94.  Id. 
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Another category of cases involving the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment consider the review of administrative conduct.95 
Tribunals usually refer to two factors that determine whether an 
investor has been treated fairly by an administrative decision: 
legitimate expectations and due process.96 Legitimate expectations 
concern the treatment afforded to an investor by reference to the law 
of the host State at the time of the investment.97 Meanwhile, due 
process depends on whether administrative decisions have been 
reached through a fair process, or if the host State acted according to 
improper purposes within its administrative powers.98 In terms of 
legitimate expectations, the ICSID Tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico 
defined the scope of the fair and equitable treatment standard based 
on an autonomous interpretation under the Spain-Mexico BIT.99 It 
stated that the fair and equitable treatment provision requires the 
Contracting Parties to provide international investments treatment that 
does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by 
the foreign investor to make the investment.100 According to the 
Tribunal, the foreign investor expects the host State to act in a 
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparent in its 
relations with the foreign investor.101 
The second factor that determines the treatment of the investor is 
due process in administrative decision-making.102 Proper due process 
bars arbitrary and discriminatory decisions against non-nationals, 
requires transparent proceedings, prohibits use of improper purposes, 
forbids inconsistency of conduct vis-a-vis the investor, and also 
forbids coercion or harassment by State authorities and bad faith.103 
                                                                                                                                     
95.  See Malik, supra note 88; Schill, supra note 88. 
96. See Malik, supra note 88, at 11; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 
233-34 (clarifying the two ways in which the administrative conduct can violate the fair and 
equitable treatment). 
97. See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 234 (explaining what the 
legitimate expectation is). 
98. See id. (identifying the concept of due process). 
99. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mex., ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 
155 (May 29, 2003). 
100.  See id. ¶ 99 (defining when the concept of legitimate expectations is violated). 
101. See id.  
102. See Malik, supra note 88, at 13-15; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, 
at 239 (introducing the importance of due process). 
103.  See McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 239-43; Malik, supra note 88, 
at 14-15 (defining the concept of due process). 
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A second standard of protection in favor of the investor involves 
full protection and security,104 which concerns a State’s failures to 
protect an investor’s property from actual damage caused by either 
corrupt State officials or by the actions of others where the State has 
failed to exercise due diligence.105 It is thus principally concerned 
with the exercise of police power.106 
According to the ICSID Tribunal a State has an obligation to 
take reasonable steps to protect its investors against harassment by 
third parties and/or State actors.107 However, the ICSID Tribunal has 
rejected the argument that the full protection and security standard 
creates absolute liability.108 One of the most contested issues with 
respect to the standard of full protection and security is whether or not 
it extends beyond situations where the physical security of the 
investor is compromised, including damages to intangible assets.109 
The concept of national treatment is considered in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (‟NAFTA”) article 1102.110 It 
ensures that each party shall accord to the investments of foreign 
investors treatment no less favorable than that it accords to 
investments of its own investors.111 In particular, the ICSID Tribunal 
has held that the treatment accorded a foreign-owned investment 
should be compared with that accorded a domestic investment in the 
same business or economic sector.112 
                                                                                                                                     
104. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, USTR art. 5(2) [hereinafter U.S. 
Model BIT]. 
105. See id., at art. 5(2)(b) (defining the concept of the full protection and security 
standard). 
106. See id. (addressing the link between the full protection and security standard and the 
police power). 
107. See generally AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. 
Hung., ARB/07/22, Award, (Sept. 23, 2010). 
108. See Asian Agric. Products Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶ 48 
(June 27, 1990). 
109. See Jeffery Commission, The Full Protection and Security Standard in Practice, 
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Apr. 16, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2009/04/16/the-full-
protection-and-security-standard-in-practice/; Mahnaz Malik, The Full Protection and Security 
Standard Comes of Age: Yet Another Challenge for States in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 
IISD. ( Nov. 2011) 6-7, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/full_protection.pdf (addressing the 
problem of physical security). 
110. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1102(2), Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
111. See id. 
112. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Can., Interim Award, ¶ 64-105 (June 26, 2000), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0674.pdf. 
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The most favored nation treatment is also recognized as an 
international customary law clause.113 The International Law 
Commission (‟ILC”) has defined the most favored nation treatment as 
“treatment accorded by the granting State to the beneficiary State, or 
to persons or things in a determined relationship with that State,” 
which must not be “less favorable than treatment extended by the 
granting State to a third State or to persons or things in the same 
relationship with that third State.”114 
In relation to expropriation, when a State seized an investor’s 
assets without compensation as part of a program of economic reform 
in the past, the classic reaction was that the investor, in search of 
compensation, could only seek diplomatic protection.115 
Consequently, States would only select to honor claims motivated by 
political concerns.116 This claim has expanded with the proliferation 
of investment treaties.117 An expropriation is a governmental taking of 
property, for which compensation is usually required.118 In addition to 
tangible property, intangible property rights, such as shareholder and 
contractual rights, can also be expropriated.119 Thus, in SPP v. Egypt, 
the Tribunal rejected the argument that the term “expropriation” 
applies only to property rights.120 The primary concern here is that the 
                                                                                                                                     
113. See Draft Articles on Most-Favored-Nation Clauses with Commentaries, [1978] 2 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 15, art. 5. 
114.  Id. 
115. See Christoph Schreuer, Investment Protection and International Relations, in THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 345, 345 (A. Reinisch & U. Kriebaum eds., 2007), 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/87_investment_protect.pdf; TODD WEILER, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, 
NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (2005) 
(addressing the problem of the diplomatic protection for investments). 
116. See id. (explaining the investor’s protection in the past). 
117. See Schreuer supra note 116, at 345-46; Weiler, supra note 116 (noting that 
expropriation claims increased along the growth of the international investment agreements). 
118. See Bassant El Attar et. al., Expropriation Clauses in International Investment 
Agreements and the Appropriate Room for Host States to Enact Regulations: A Practical 
Guide for States and Investors, GRADUATE INSTITUTE 5-9 (June 2009), 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/Research%20Projec
ts/Trade%20Law%20Clinic/Expropriation%20clauses%20in%20International%20Investment
%20Agreements%20and%20the%20appropriate%20room%20for%20host%20States%20to%2
0enact%20regulations,%202009.pdf; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 266; 
Uchkunova, supra note 79 (defining the concept of expropriation). 
119. See Southern Pac. Prop. (Middle East) Limited v. Egypt, ARB/84/3, Award, ¶ 164 
(May 20,1992) (explaining which rights can be subject to expropriation). 
120. See id. (quoting the Tribunal in SPP v. Egypt). 
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definitions of expropriation included in investment treaties is so 
general that they are not of any practical use for parties or tribunals.121 
The model Canada BIT contains a typical provision that 
prohibits expropriation without just compensation.122 Article 13.1 of 
the model Canada BIT expresses that a State cannot expropriate an 
investment “except for a public purpose, in accordance with due 
process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and on prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation.”123 
The intent to expropriate is not usually considered a requirement 
in order to identify an expropriation (the “sole effective doctrine”).124 
A common problem involves distinguishing between lawful and 
unlawful expropriation.125 Some authorities believe illegal takings 
require higher compensation, including damages.126 Moreover, it is 
important to distinguish nationalization and expropriation. Usually, 
nationalizations involve large-scale takings, while expropriation 
refers to single state acts.127 
Expropriation is usually distinguished as being either direct or 
indirect. Direct expropriation refers to a mandatory legal transfer of 
the title of property or its outright physical seizure operated by a 
formal law or decree or physical act.128 On the other hand, indirect 
expropriations do not have a clear or unequivocal definition; they 
materialize through actions or conduct, which do not explicitly 
express the purpose of depriving one of rights or assets but actually 
                                                                                                                                     
121. It has been said of NAFTA, art. 1110 (1) that its “language is of such generality as 
to be difficult to apply in specific cases.” Marvin Feldman v. Mex., ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 
98 (Dec. 16, 2002). 
122. See Canada Model Bilateral International Treaty art. 13, ¶ 1. 
123. Id. 
124. See Weiler, supra note 116, at 615; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, 
at 270 (clarifying that the intent to expropriate is not necessary to identify an expropriation). 
125.  See Weiler, supra note 116, at 631; Cameron McKenna, Tribunal weighs on 
unlawful expropriation, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=1d18d9b9-778a-4041-ab4b-5ec6c4db6871 (noting the difference between 
lawful and unlawful expropriation). 
126.  See supra note 110 (addressing the difference between lawful and unlawful 
expropriation). 
127.  See Weiler, supra note 116, at 607-08; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 
14, at 296 (describing the difference between expropriation and nationalization). 
128.  Expropriation, UNCTAD (2003), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_
en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Expropriation]; “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to 
Regulate” in International Investment Law”, (OECD, Working Paper No. 2004/04, 2004), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321; Suzy H. Nikièma, Best Practices: Indirect 
Expropriation, IISD (Mar. 2012). http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/best_practice_indirect_
expropriation.pdf (defining direct expropriation). 
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have that effect.129 ICSID Tribunals have held that there is no 
expropriation when there is only an omission of state action; rather, 
an intentional act must occur.130 Moreover, there is no expropriation 
when the investor consents to the expropriatory measure, as 
expropriation must be a compulsory transfer.131 
There are different forms of indirect expropriation, such as 
creeping expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation.132 
Creeping expropriation is not the result of a single state action, but 
results from a number of actions that gradually result in 
expropriation.133 A measure tantamount to expropriation is a state 
action that is not superficially intended to expropriate, but is still 
considered a type of expropriation.134 According to the arbitral 
decision in S.D. Meyers v. Canada, “[t]he primary meaning of the 
word ‘tantamount’ given by the Oxford English Dictionary is 
‘equivalent,’ both words require a tribunal to look at the substance of 
what has occurred and not only the form.”135 
States often conclude contracts with investors. However, not 
every breach of such contracts constitutes an expropriation.136 The 
most important criterion for distinguishing between a simple breach 
of contract and the expropriation of contract rights is whether the 
State acts in its commercial role as a party to the contract or in its 
sovereign capacity.137 Not all government measures entitle the 
investor to compensation. Often, if the deprivation of ownership is not 
                                                                                                                                     
129.  See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mex., ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 
114 (May 29, 2003). 
130.  See Eudoro Armando Olguin v. Para., ARB/98/5, Award, ¶ [insert para. #] (July 
26, 2001). 
131.  See Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Alb., ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 135 (Dec. 
24, 1996). 
132.  See Peter D. Isakoff, Defining the Scope of Indirect Expropriation for 
International Investments, 3 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 189, 195 (2013); Christoph Schreuer, The 
Concept of Expropriation under the ETC and other Investment Protection Treaties 5-6 (May 
20, 2005), http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (listing the different forms 
of indirect expropriation). 
133.   See Isakoff, supra note 132, at 195-96; Schreuer supra note 132, at 4-5 (defining 
creeping expropriation). 
134.  See  Isakoff supra note 132, at 193-94; Schreuer supra note 132, at 5-6 (giving the 
definition of measure as tantamount to expropriation). 
135.  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Can., Partial Award, ¶ 285 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
136.  See Schreuer, supra note 132, at 1; UNCTAD Expropriation, supra note 128, at 26 
(outlining the difference between a breach of a contract and an expropriation). 
137.  See id. (explaining how to identify when a breach of contract implies an 
expropriation). 
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radical, fundamental, in significant part, substantial, or serious, no 
compensation can be claimed because the act represents merely a 
regulatory measure.138 Nowadays, most investment treaties contain a 
provision in which the host State agrees to comply with any 
obligation undertaken with respect to investments of the other State; 
the effect of which is to elevate contract breaches to actual treaty 
violations.139 It is vital to distinguish between contract claims and 
treaty claims.140 Contract claims arise when there is a breach of 
contract, whereas treaty claims deal with violations of a treaty.141 Not 
only will the jurisdiction differ for each claim, but the applicable law 
will also vary.142 In contract claims, the tribunal will apply the 
applicable law for the contract, which is usually chosen by the parties; 
in treaty claims, the tribunal will apply relevant international law.143 
Moreover, a tribunal may be jurisdictionally limited in determining 
claims of treaty breach, or may have jurisdiction over the contractual 
rights if the parties agree to it.144 This distinction is not present if a 
treaty contains a so-called “umbrella clause.”145 For instance, Article 
II.2(c) of the United States-Argentina BIT provides that “[e]ach party 
shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
                                                                                                                                     
138.  See Weiler, supra note 116, at 621; Andrew Paul Newcombe, Regulatory 
Expropriation, Investment Protectionand International Law: When Is Government Regulation 
Expropriatory and When Should Compensation Be Paid? 73 (1999) (Master of Laws thesis, 
University of Toronto), http://www.italaw.com/documents/RegulatoryExpropriation.pdf .  
139.  See Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pak., ARB/01/13, Objection to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 163 (Aug. 6, 2003); McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 92; 
Granè, supra note 85(defining the umbrella clause). 
140.  See McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 127; see generally 
Emmanuel Gaillard, Treaty-Based Jurisdiction: Broad Dispute, Resolution Clauses, 234 N.Y. 
L. J. 1 (2005), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2005/10/
TreatyBased-Jurisdiction-Broad-Dispute-Resolutio__/Files/Download-PDF-TreatyBased-
Jurisdiction-Broad-Disp__/FileAttachment/IA_100605.pdf (specifying that there is a 
difference between contract claims and treaty claims). 
141. See JAN OLE VOSS, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES ON CONTRACTS 
BETWEEN HOST STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTORS 166 (2011); Schreuer, supra note 132 
(discussing the difference between contract claims and treaty claims). 
142. See Voss, supra note 141, at 165-67; Schreuer supra note 132 (articulating the 
consequences of the difference between contract claims and treaty claims). 
143. See id. (discussing applicable law). 
144. See id. (referring to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal). 
145. See McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 92; Grané, supra note 85, 
(specifying the function of the umbrella clause). 
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investments.”146 However, there is no consistency in how these cases 
have been decided.147 
In SGS v. Pakistan, the Tribunal rejected the notion that a 
contract claim could be transformed into a treaty claim by virtue of an 
umbrella clause.148 A few months later, the same Tribunal interpreted 
another umbrella clause differently in SGS v. Philippines, stating that 
“each Contracting Party shall observe any legal obligation it has 
assumed, or will in the future assume, with regard to specific 
investments covered by the BIT.”149 Arbitral tribunals generally 
interpret these clauses differently, so it is likely that umbrella clauses 
will remain one of the most controversial areas of international 
investment law.150 
3. Parallel Proceedings 
If an investment treaty does not expressly provide for it, there is 
no requirement to exhaust local remedies as condition precedent to 
the invocation of a tribunal’s jurisdiction.151 Moreover, the pursuit of 
local remedies will not preclude the investor from subsequent 
invocation of a treaty claim unless prohibited by an express treaty 
provision.152 This could require an election in remedies or a treaty 
provision requiring the waiver of all claims as a condition of valid 
invocation of treaty arbitration.153 Sometimes agreements contain a 
                                                                                                                                     
146.  Treaty between U.S. and Arg. Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of Investment, U.S-Arg., art. 2(c), Nov, 14, 1991, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/43475.pdf. 
147.  See Gramont & Gritsenko, supra note 57, at 51; McLachlan, Shore & Weiniger, 
supra note 14, at 111 (addressing a problem related to the umbrella clause). 
148.  See Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pak., ARB/01/13, Objection to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 167 (Aug. 6, 2003). 
149.  Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Phil., ARB/02/6, Objection to 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 115, 119 (Jan. 29, 2004). 
150.  See Granè, supra note 85; Gramont & Gritsenko, supra note 57, at 53 (noting that 
the umbrella clause represents an issue in investment arbitration). 
151.  See Memorandum from Bahakal Yimer, Nicolas Cisneros, Laura Bisiani & Rahul 
Donde, Graduate Inst. Int’l Dev. 9 (June 10, 2011), http://graduateinstitute.ch 
/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/Law%20Clinic/Memoranda%202011/UNCT
AD_Memo.pdf; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 128 (specifying that the 
exhaustion of local remedies is usually not required). 
152. See LUIZ EDUARDO SALLES & AZEVEDO SETTE, FORUM SHOPPING IN 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE ROLE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 245 (2016); 
McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 129; Memorandum from Yimer, et. al., 
supra note 151 (defining the fork in the road and the waiver). 
153. See Salles, supra note 120; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 29; 
Memorandum from Yimer, et. al., supra note 151.  
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“cooling-off period” provision.154 This is intended to encourage 
disputants to engage in consultation and negotiation, generally for a 
period of three to six months, and to give them the opportunity to 
amicably and confidentially reach a possible solution on their own.155 
Where the same underlying dispute gives rise to claims under 
two different investment treaties, each tribunal is faced with a 
potential problem of parallel proceedings within the same legal order, 
which may give rise to issues under the doctrines of res judicata and 
lis pendens.156 The doctrine of res judicata applies to the decisions of 
international arbitral tribunals as a general principle of law, common 
to most nations.157 In applying the doctrine to another arbitral award, 
the tribunal must consider whether there is sufficient identity of 
parties, subject matter, and cause of action in order to arbitrate.158 On 
the other hand, the concept of lis pendens—the existence of 
proceedings before another international tribunal over a dispute 
related to a substantially same matter—entitles the tribunal to stay its 
proceedings as an exercise of its discretion.159 
B. European Union and United States Approaches during the 
Negotiations of the TTIP 
This Part will focus on the United States and the European 
Union as Contracting Parties to the TTIP.  Part B.1 describes the EU 
background, competence, available drafts released to the public, and 
the main provisions of the proposed agreement.  Part B.2 considers 
the United States Model BIT, the principal source establishing the 
United States’ point of view. Part B.3 outlines the twelve issues 
                                                                                                                                     
154.  See Joel Dahlquist, Emergency Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Disputes, 
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2015), http:// kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/03/10/ 
emergency-arbitrators-in-investment-treaty-disputes/; see also Memorandum from Yimer, et. 
al., supra note 151, at 12 (introducing the cooling off period). 
155. See supra note 154.  
156. See Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga and Harout Jack Samra, A Defense of Dissents in 
Investment Arbitration, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 445 (2012); McLalchlan, Shore & 
Weiniger, supra note 14, at 130 (addressing the problems of res judicata and lis pendens). 
157. See Fraga & Samra supra note 156; McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, 
at 130 (clarifying the concept of res judicata). 
158. See id. (discussing the problem of res iudicata in investment arbitration). 
159.  See McLalchlan, Shore & Weiniger, supra note 14, at 121; Elisa D’Alterio, From 
judicial comity to legal comity: A judicial solution to global disorder?, 9 INT’L J. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394, 404 (2011) (considering the concept of lis pendens and how it 
works in investment arbitration). 
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discussed during the European Union’s consultation, from both 
European Union and United States perspectives. 
1. European Union Background 
With Article 207 of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has 
acquired the right to regulate foreign direct investment.160 
Consequently, the European Union can exercise the exclusive 
authority provided by the Lisbon Treaty and reform the regime of the 
existing treaties signed by its Member States.161  In June 2012 a first 
draft text for a European Union-wide regulation establishing a 
framework for the management of financial responsibility for 
investor-state dispute settlement tribunals (“the European Union 
Draft”) was released.162 The European Commission’s Trade Policy 
Committee released initial negotiating objectives for the TTIP 
(“European Union Directive”) in June 2013 in a private 
correspondence with Member States.163 
The ISDS clause found in the TTIP initiated debate in the 
European Union Commission and, as a result, the Commission 
organized a public consultation on twelve issues between March 27 
and July 13, 2014.164  The consultation outlined a possible unified EU 
approach in order to achieve a balance between the protection of 
investors and the European Union’s and Member States’ right to 
regulate.165 Obviously, all the documents related to TTIP (according 
to the European Court of Justice) will be subject to European Union 
transparency procedures.166 
                                                                                                                                     
160.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 207, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; Commission Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for 
Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals 
Established by International Agreements to which the European Union is Party, at 3, COM 
(2012) 335 final (May 6, 2012) [hereinafter European Union Draft]. 
161. See TFEU art. 207; European Union Draft, see supra note 160, at 3. 
162. See generally European Union Draft, supra note 160. 
163. See generally Initial Position Paper of the Trade Policy Committee on 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), COM (2013) 238/13 (June 20, 2013), 
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/tpc-ttip-non-papers-for-1st-round-negotiatons-june20-
2013.pdf. 
164. See European Commission Press Release IP/14/292, European Commission 
launches public online consultation on investor protection in TTIP (Mar. 27, 2014) 
(emphasizing the role of public opinion in EU rulemaking) [hereinafter EU Press Release]. 
165. See id. (stating the value of the public consultation). 
166. See Case C-350/12 P, Council v. Int’l Veld, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2039 
(Jul 3, 2014), ¶ 89 (clarifying the role of transparency in EU). 
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In November 2015, the European Commission completed its 
new approach to investment protection and investment dispute 
resolution for the TTIP, proposing the creation of an Investment 
Court System.167 The Investment Court System would replace all the 
ISDS mechanisms in European Union agreements, aiming to create a 
permanent mechanism in investment dispute solution if the other 
party of the European Union agreement will accept it.168 
2. United States Background 
While the European Union has publicly stated its desire to 
release an official public text of the European Union position on the 
ISDS provision in the TTIP, the United States does not want to 
publicly release any information regarding these closed-door 
negotiations.169 To understand the United States approach, it is 
necessary to refer to the Model United States BIT adopted in 2004 
and revised by the Obama administration in 2012.170 Like its 
predecessor (the 2004 Model BIT), the 2012 Model BIT provides 
strong investor protections and preserves the government’s ability to 
regulate in favor of the public interest.171  The Obama administration 
made several important changes to the text of the Model BIT to 
enhance transparency and public participation, sharpen the disciplines 
                                                                                                                                     
167. See EU finalises proposal for investment protection and Court System for TTIP, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Nov. 12, 2015), http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/ 
index.cfm?id=1396 [hereinafter EU finalises proposal]; European Union Proposal for 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade In Services, Investment And E-
Commerce, Chapter II (Nov. 12, 2015) [hereinafter European Union Proposal on the 
Investment Permanent Court] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/ november/tradoc_
153955.pdf (introducing the investment permanent court). 
168.  See supra note 167. 
169.  See Weaver, supra note 7, at 258–59; James Crisp, US to open TTIP reading rooms 
across EU, EURACTIV (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/us-
open-ttip-reading-rooms-across-eu-314175 (providing a detailed account of the reading rooms 
set-up in U.S. embassies to provide information to the EU citizens). 
170. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104; see generally European Union Proposal on 
the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167 (introducing the main source in order to 
identify the United States view on investor-state arbitration). 
171. See generally Press Release, Off. U.S. Trade Representative and U.S. Dep’t St., 
United States Concludes Review of Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, (Apr. 2012), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2012/april/united-states-
concludes-review-model-bilateral-inves. 
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that address preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises, and 
strengthen protections relating to labor and the environment.172 
3. The United States and European Union on the Twelve Issues 
The twelve main questions that have been subject to public 
consultation in Europe regard the main classical provisions in a BIT. 
These issues are a starting point for comparison between United 
States and European Union perspectives on the TTIP. This Part will 
analyze differences and similarities between these perspectives and 
consider the United States Model BIT, the European Union drafts, 
and other relevant public documents. 
a. Scope of the Substantive Investment Protection Provisions 
Both the United States and the European Union have a very 
broad definition of investment modeled in accordance with the Salini 
case, discussed above.173 In Salini, this definition included 
contributions to the economic development of the host State, 
monetary contributions, a certain duration of performance for a 
contract, and participation in the risks of the transaction.174 The 
United States Model BIT and European Union Proposal on the 
Investment Permanent Court also provide similar lists of examples of 
investment, which include enterprise, shares, stocks and other forms 
of equity participation in an enterprise, bonds, debentures and other 
debt instruments of an enterprise, loans to an enterprise, and others.175 
b. Non-Discriminatory Treatment for Investors 
Both the European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent 
Court and United States Model BIT stipulate that foreign investors 
                                                                                                                                     
172.  See id. (stating the differences between the U.S. Model BIT of 2004 and the U.S. 
Model BIT of 2012). 
173.  See Salini, supra note 76. 
174.  See id. at 622 (“The doctrine generally considers that investment infers: 
contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a participation in the risks 
of the transaction. In reading the Convention's preamble, one may add the contribution to the 
economic development of the host State of the investment as an additional condition.” [citation 
omitted]). 
175.  See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 1; European Union Proposal on the 
Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167 (defining “investment” in the preamble to its 
chapter II).      
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should not be discriminated against.176 At the same time, the 
aforementioned materials recognize that in certain rare cases, 
discrimination against investors may need to be envisaged.177 While 
the United States Model BIT is silent, the European Union includes 
exceptions for differences in treatment between investors and 
investments where necessary to achieve public policy objectives (the 
protection of health, the environment, consumers, etc.).178 
c. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Concerning the fair and equitable treatment standard, the main 
objective of the European Union proposal is to clarify the standard in 
a way that a State may be held responsible only for breaches of a 
limited set of basic rights.179 These include the denial of justice; the 
disregard of the fundamental principles of due process; manifest 
arbitrariness; targeted discrimination based on gender, race, or 
religious belief; and abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress or 
harassment.180 In contrast, the United States Model BIT describes this 
provision only referring to the concept of the denial of justices and 
due process.181 
d. Expropriation 
On the topic of expropriation, the United States and European 
Union approaches are very similar, as they refer to the typical 
definition of expropriation.182 One difference between the two 
documents is that the European Union draft is more detailed on public 
                                                                                                                                     
176.  See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 3, annex B (considering the non- 
discrimination clause). 
177.  See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, 
art. 2; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, annex B (analyzing the exception to the non- 
discrimination clause). 
178. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, 
art. 2; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, annex B (explaining the specificity of the European 
Union provision). 
179. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, 
art. 3 (addressing the objective of European Union regarding the fair and equitable treatment). 
180. See id. (mentioning the main rights linked to the fair and equitable treatment). 
181. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 5 (considering the United States point of 
view in the fair and equitable treatment). 
182. See id. art. 6; European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra 
note 167, art. 5 (considering in general the position of the Contracting Parties on the 
expropriation clause). 
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welfare objectives.183 The United States considers public welfare 
objectives to include public health, safety, and the environment.184 
Meanwhile, the European Union considers non-discriminatory 
measures taken for legitimate public purposes to include the 
protection of public health, safety, environment or public morals; 
social or consumer protection; or promotion and protection of cultural 
diversity.185 
e. Ensuring the Right to Regulate and Investment Protection 
Article 2 of the European Union Proposal on the Investment 
Permanent Court contains specific language describing permissible 
regulatory measures.186 The objective is to achieve a balance between 
the protection of investors and the Member States’ right to regulate.187 
The European Union plans to safeguard the Member States’ right to 
regulate as a basic underlying principle so that investment protection 
standards cannot be interpreted by arbitral tribunals in a manner that 
would detrimentally affect the right to regulate. Meanwhile, the 
European Union would ensure that all the necessary safeguards and 
exceptions are in place.188 There is no specific United States provision 
on this issue.189 
f. Transparency in ISDS 
Both the United States Model and the European Union Proposal 
on the Investment Permanent Court aim to ensure transparency and 
openness in the ISDS system under the TTIP, making hearings open 
and all documents available to the public.190 The European 
Commission also proposed to include the 2013 UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State-Arbitration as 
                                                                                                                                     
183.  See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, annex 1 (explaining how the European Union 
provision is more detailed). 
184. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, annex B (discussing the United States 
provision on expropriation). 
185. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, 
Annex 1 (considering the European Union provision on expropriation). 
186.  See id. art. 2 (introducing the concept of regulatory measure). 
187. See EU Press Release, supra note 164 (discussing the aim of the EU). 
188. See id. (analyzing the objective of the EU). 
189. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104 (underlying that there is not a provision on the 
right to regulate in the U.S. Model BIT). 
190. See EU Press Release, supra note 164, at 19; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 
29 (describing the purpose of the European Union and U.S.). 
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mandatory within the TTIP.191 These rules would “contribute 
significantly to the establishment of a harmonized legal framework 
for a fair and efficient settlement of international investment disputes, 
increase transparency and accountability and promote good 
governance.”192 
g. Multiple Claims and Relationship to Domestic Courts 
Both the United States and the European Union address the 
problem of multiple claims since investors are able to either seek to 
obtain redress in domestic courts or to submit a claim to the relevant 
Investment Tribunal.193 They also require a cooling-off period, where 
before seeking arbitration the parties must engage in consultation or 
mediation.194 Nevertheless, no mandatory exhaustion of local 
remedies is required.195 
h. Arbitrator Ethics, Conduct and Qualifications 
The US Model BIT suggests that an arbitration tribunal be 
comprised of three arbitrators: one appointed by each party and the 
third appointed by agreement of the disputing parties.196 In contrast, 
the European Union proposes a Permanent Investment Court system, 
an innovative composition involving a tribunal of first instance, 
composed by fifteen judges — five nationals of a Member State of the 
European Union, five nationals of the United States, and five 
nationals of third countries.197 The EU text also affirms that it is 
desirable that the arbitrator will have expertise in international 
                                                                                                                                     
191.  See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, 
art. 18 (analyzing the European Union proposal). 
192. See Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State-Arbitration, UNCITRAL 
(2014), prmbl (clarifying the object of the rule). 
193.  See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, 
at 14; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 23 (introducing the multiple claim issue). 
194. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, 
arts.  2-5; U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 23 (addressing the cooling-off period clause). 
195. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167; 
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 24 (discussing the absence of the exhaustion of local 
remedies provision). 
196. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 27 (describing how the tribunal should be 
composed according to the U.S. Model BIT). 
197. See Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in Services, Investment 
and E-Commerce, art. 9 (Nov. 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/ docs/ 2015/ september/  
tradoc_153807.pdf (introducing the tribunal of first instance and analyzing the European 
Union proposal). 
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investment law, international trade law, and the resolution of disputes 
arising under international investment or international trade 
agreements.198 The European Union also aims to realize a roster of 
qualified experts to ensure that both the European Union and the 
United States have agreed to and vetted the arbitrators, ensuring their 
abilities and independence.199 
i. Reducing the Risk of Frivolous and Unfounded Cases 
The European Union proposes the introduction of instruments to 
easily dismiss frivolous claims.200 For instance, the European Union is 
proposing that the losing party to any arbitration case should bear all 
reasonable costs of the proceedings if a disputing party has acted 
improperly by raising manifestly frivolous objections, improper 
preliminary objections, or unfounded claims.201 The US Model BIT 
only refers to the possibility that the tribunal considers the claimant’s 
claim or the respondent’s objection in order to verify whether or not it 
is frivolous.202 
j. Allowing Claims To Proceed (Filter) 
The European Union intends to introduce a specific mechanism 
called a filter.203 A filter grants a party to the agreement the possibility 
to intervene and dismiss claims in particular cases that involve 
measures taken for prudential reasons, in order to protect the overall 
stability and integrity of the financial system.204 The protection of the 
financial system is also considered in the US Model BIT, establishing 
a sovereign right to regulate for the United States in certain areas.205 
                                                                                                                                     
198. See id., art. 9.4 (considering the requirements for an arbitrator according to the 
European Union proposal). 
199. See id. (explaining the selection process in the European Union proposal). 
200. See EU Press Release, supra note 164 (stating the European Union proposal on 
frivolous claim). 
201. See  European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, 
art. 28.2 (explaining the European Union proposal). 
202. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 28 (describing the United States 
provision). 
203. See EU Press Release, supra note 164 (introducing the European Union proposal 
on claims). 
204. See id. (discussing the European Union proposal). 
205. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104 (noting the lack of any filter in the US model 
Bit on the same topic). 
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k. Guidance by the Parties on the Interpretation of the Agreement 
The United States and the European Union have an identical 
approach on interpretation.206 They agree on the binding interpretation 
that ISDS Tribunals must respect to limit undesirable interpretations 
by ISDS Tribunals.207 Moreover, the parties agree to establish that the 
non-disputing party may invite written or oral submissions on issues 
relating to the interpretation of the Agreement.208 
l. Appellate Mechanism and Consistency of Rulings 
One of the main criticisms in international investment arbitration 
is the lack of an appellate mechanism.209 The European Union aims to 
establish a bilateral appellate mechanism in the TTIP, in order to 
allow review of the investor state arbitration awards investor state 
dispute solution rulings.210 The proposed appellate body would exist 
as a permanent Appeal Tribunal composed of six Members: of whom 
two shall be nationals of a Member State of the European Union, two 
of the United States, and two of third countries.211 The Appeal 
Tribunal Members would be appointed for a six-year term, renewable 
once.212 It is implicitly required that the Members of the Appeal 
Tribunal shall possess the qualifications required in their respective 
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or be jurists 
of recognized competence.213 
The introduction of this body would help ensure consistency in 
the interpretation of the TTIP and would provide both the government 
and the investor with the opportunity to appeal against awards and to 
correct arbitrator errors.214 The European Union proposes that the 
                                                                                                                                     
206. See id. art. 30.3; European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court 
supra note 167, art. 13 (analyzing similarities between United States and European Union). 
207. See id. (describing the approach of United States and European Union on 
interpretation). 
208. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 28; European Union Proposal on the 
Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, art. 22.3 (observing that the parties can submit 
questions related to the interpretation of the Agreement). 
209. See generally Concept Paper, Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform 
(May 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF(analyzing a 
criticism in investor-state arbitration). 
210. See EU Press Release, supra note 164 (addressing the objective of the EU). 
211. See id. (debating the European Union proposal). 
212. See id. (specifying the tribunal term). 
213. See id. (describing the qualities of the panel). 
214. See id. (analyzing the benefit of an appellate tribunal); European Comm’n Staff, 
Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement 
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appellate body will have jurisdiction over the following alleged 
errors: interpretation or application of applicable law; appreciation of 
the facts, including the appreciation of relevant domestic law; or, 
those provided for in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.215 
Although there is no appellate mechanism in the US Model BIT, the 
United States has acknowledged the possibility of developing one 
under other institutional arrangements, while always guaranteeing 
transparency.216 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE US AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
APPROACHES TO THE TTIP 
This Part analyzes how the negotiation will likely play out 
between the United States and the European Union, and whether or 
not the differences could prevent the realization of the TTIP. The text 
concerning the definition of “investment” will be negotiated between 
the two sides without significant difficulty.217 Regarding 
discriminatory treatment, while the European Union texts seem to be 
more specific, the two proposals are quite similar, indicating that no 
significant disagreements should arise.218 Concerning fair and 
equitable treatment, the United States provision is not as specific as 
the EU Drafts and the other official EU texts.219 The presence of 
public pressure in Europe may result in narrowing the United States 
general rule.220 
During the negotiation procedures, it is likely that an issue may 
arise on the TTIP’s expropriation provision.221 In particular, the role 
of the regulatory measures is fundamental, and this means that the 
parties should negotiate in order to understand which areas must be 
                                                                                                                                     
(ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (European 
Comimission, Working Paper SWD (2015) 3, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ 
docs/2015 /january/tradoc_153044.pdf (analyzing the advantages in creating the appellate 
body). 
215. See European Union Proposal on the Investment Permanent Court, supra note 167, 
art. 10 (stating which the competence of the tribunal should be). 
216.  See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 104, art. 28 (describing the provision related to 
the appellate body in the U.S. Model BIT). 
217.  See generally supra notes 173-75 (discussing the negotiation on the definition of 
investment). 
218.  See generally supra notes 176-78 (debating on non-discrimination treatment). 
219.  See generally supra notes 179-81 (analyzing the difference on fair and equitable 
treatment between the US and EU). 
220.  See supra note 164 (referring to the problem of public opinion). 
221.  See generally supra notes 182-85 (discussing expropriation). 
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considered legitimate for non-compensation.222 Even though there is 
not a specific provision on the right to regulate in the US Model, the 
relevant texts of the European Union and United States do not appear 
to have any major differences.223 Considering the issue of 
transparency, even if both parties agree on most of the provisions, 
many criticisms arise, and will continue to arise, on three overlapping 
problems that must be considered further: the main characteristics of 
arbitration in confidentiality; the right of public knowledge, 
considering that citizens will have the burden of the compensation 
resulting from citizen’s awards; and the possibility that an appointed 
arbitrator’s decision-making will be influenced if the result is 
publicized.224 
Another problem could be presented by the multiple claim 
system.225 On the one hand this is normal, considering that the idea 
behind ISDS is to create a “de-politicized” national court and the 
delay that arises from a double level of jurisdiction.226 On the other 
hand, requiring the exhaustion of local remedies could effectively 
favor the domestic courts, avoiding the possibility of parallel 
proceedings.227 And even if the contracting parties do not have 
substantial differences on the relationship between domestic and 
international courts, neither the United States nor European Union 
have considered all aspects or potential issues, as stressed by public 
opinion in Europe.228 
The European Union’s proposal of an Investment Permanent 
Court could represent a problem for the negotiation.229 This 
                                                                                                                                     
222.  See generally supra notes 186-89 (addressing the problem of regulatory measure). 
223.  See id. (considering the position of the contracting parties on regulatory measure). 
224. See generally supra notes 190-92 (introducing new criticism on transparency). 
225. See generally supra notes 193-95 (introducing a possible problem on multiple 
claims). 
226. See generally supra notes 196-99 (considering a disadvantage of the exhaustion of 
local remedies).  
227. See generally supra notes 200-02 (taking into account an advantage of the 
exhaustion of local remedies). 
228. See supra note 164 (introducing the problem of public opinion on multiple claims). 
229. See Stephan Schill, The TTIP Negotiations: US Versus EU Leadership in Global 
Investment Governance, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 5, 2016), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/03/05/the-ttip-negotiations-us-versus-eu-leadership-in-
global-investment-governance/; Mirjam van de Hel-Koedoot, The Proposed New Investment 
Court System for TTIP: The Right Way Forward?, EFILA BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015), 
http://efilablog.org/2015/10/14/the-proposed-new-investment-court-system-for-ttip-the-right-
way-forward/ (“[T]he U.S. Chamber of Commerce announced on the day of publication of the 
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mechanism is not present in the US Model BIT and, since the 
publication of European Union document, the United States has still 
not officially expressed an opinion.230 
Even if the US Model BIT does not contain a specific filter for 
frivolous claims, it is plausible for the negotiations to reach a 
compromise on this matter.231 The filter mechanism will depend on a 
political compromise between the parties. Meanwhile, interpretation 
of norms should not create a debate, given the congruence between 
US and EU understandings.232 Finally, considering the TTIP’s 
appellate system, the question remains whether this body will 
resemble a judicial proceeding or an arbitration proceeding.233 
CONCLUSION 
It is dubious whether the TTIP will come to fruition, but in the 
event that it does, it holds the potential to revolutionize the global 
economy.234 The United States and the European Union, two huge 
modern economies, have the chance to create a completely new 
system that it will make trade and investment between them much 
simpler.235 However, numerous concerns exist in relation to all the 
chapters within the TTIP.236 In particular, within the chapter 
pertaining to investment a number of obstacles must first be 
overcome.237 As explained earlier, the European Union has proposed 
a public consultation on twelve main issues, the resolution of which 
deals with most of these concerns.238 
                                                                                                                                     
Proposal that ‘the proposal is deeply flawed’ and that the US ‘cannot in any way endorse 
today’s European Union proposal as a model.”). 
230.   See supra note 229 and accompanying text (considering the US position). 
231.  See generally supra notes 203-05 (proposing a solution of the filter mechanism). 
232.  See generally supra notes 206-09 (stating that the political compromise is the 
solution). 
233.  See generally supra notes 209-16 (addressing few problems that could arise from 
the creation of an appellate body). 
234. See supra Part I(A); Michael Beckerman, The Future of the Global Economy 
Depends on the U.S.-EU Trade Deal, HUFFINGTON POST, (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-beckerman/the-future-of-the-global-_b_3562595.html 
(analyzing the consequences of the TTIP). 
235. See supra Introduction (addressing which area the TTIP focus on). 
236. See supra note 4 (affirming that the realization of the TTIP represents a difficult 
task). 
237. See supra notes 18-22 (considering the general issues of the investment chapter). 
238. See supra note 164 (taking into account the role of the public opinion). 
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The aim of this Comment is neither to provide a political 
analysis, nor a social one. Rather, this Comment analyzes the main 
issues concerning the TTIP’s investor-state arbitration dispute 
solution provisions, looking exclusively at US and EU texts for 
guidance. The resulting discovery is that upon dissection, the US and 
EU positions on law are not as far apart as they initially seem. 
Moreover, they seem reconcilable.239 
The United States and European Union have similar points of 
view across the scope of the substantive investment protection 
provisions, including: non-discriminatory treatment for investors; fair 
and equitable treatment; expropriation; multiple claims; the 
relationship to domestic courts; reducing the risk of frivolous and 
unfounded cases; and guidance by the parties on the interpretation of 
the agreement.240 While the United States and European Union agree 
on many issues, it remains unclear how the parties might agree on the 
following: the proposed Investment Permanent Court; an appellate 
mechanism and consistency of rulings mechanisms; transparency in 
ISDS ensuring the right to regulate; and investment protection.241 
However, with diligence and compromise, these can most likely be 
resolved if the parties are willing.242 In conclusion, the fate of the two 
of the biggest economies in the world will likely turn on the political 
and diplomatic choices made in the course of the TTIP 
negotiations.243 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
239. See supra Part III (affirming that the position between the US and EU are not 
different). 
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